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COMMENT
FEDERALISM, THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
ITS EFFECT ON THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM
Thomas Ryan Lanet
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 8, 1913, the structure of the United States government was
radically altered from the structure intentionally instituted by the framers of
the Constitution.' Yet the Seventeenth Amendment, of enormous structural
import to our government, has rested tranquilly amongst the American
people, avoiding controversy since its ratification.2 In fact, when asked to
recite the Seventeenth Amendment, few are capable of even approximating
a correct answer.3 Part of the reason why the Seventeenth Amendment has
not invoked serious debate amongst the American people is due to a
misconception; namely, that direct democracy is a preferable form of
government, one that allows for the greatest freedom to its people.4
t Law clerk to the Honorable John C. Gemmill, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division I.
J.D., cum laude, Liberty University School of Law, 2007; B.A. in mathematics, Dordt
College, 2004. Founding Editor in Chief, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 1.
1. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 ("[T~he
Seventeenth Amendment's alteration of the Senate's political constituency, providing for
election of senators directly by voters rather than by state legislatures, decreased the
institutional fitness and disposition of that body to serve as a political safeguard against
increasing federal influence."); see also Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of
History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform
Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 233 [hereinafter, Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth
Amendment] ("The Progressive Era amendments stripped away the constitutional limits on
the federal government-the New Deal simply moved in to fill this institutional vacuum.").
2. See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (1995) ("Not surprisingly, the direct election of U.S. Senators
has engendered very little commentary in the historiography of either the Constitution or of
the Progressive Era. It has been somewhat summarily adjudged a closed case.").
3. The Seventeenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote." U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis
added).
4. As Madison explains in speaking of the factions of majoritarian rule, an evil which
democracy often provides:
"When a majority is included in faction, the form of popular government [a
democracy] ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the
public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and
private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
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Another plausible explanation for the quietness of the Seventeenth
Amendment is that the argument against the direct election of Senators
may, at first blush, appear complicated to a person unfamiliar with the
organic structure of our government prior to the Seventeenth Amendment. 5
Regardless of the explanations for why the Seventeenth Amendment has
garnered so little interest amongst the American people, the Seventeenth
Amendment has had a sweeping impact on many areas of American life.
For example, the removal of the election of Senators from the state
legislative bodies enabled Congress to swallow up the states' control over
commerce, affecting an individual farmer's ability to grow wheat for use on
his own farm.6 Individual farmers, however, are not the only persons to feel
the sting of the Seventeenth Amendment's abrogation of the structural
protections from an ever encroaching national government.
Every child in America that receives a public education is affected by the
consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment.7 Increasingly, Congress
enacts legislation that has a direct impact on local public schools.8 The
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
to which our enquiries are directed."
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
Madison then continues, in a latter paragraph, discussing what form of government is
capable of achieving "the great object to which our enquiries are directed": "A republic, by
which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a
different prospect [from that of a democracy), and promises the cure for which we are
seeking." Id. (emphasis added).
5. In discussing the issue of the direct election of Senators with non-constitutional
scholars, one first has to explain what the Seventeenth Amendment states. Next, one has to
explain the process for electing Senators prior to the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment. This step generally entails numerous tangents, such as explaining the issue of
sovereignty amongst the people, the states, and the national government, explaining
federalism and bicameralism and their respective importance in our governmental system,
and explaining the purpose of the original Senate in preserving these mechanisms. Finally,
one can then begin to explain the repercussions that the Seventeenth Amendment has had on
the structure of our intended government. See discussion infra Parts II & III.
6. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that Congress' cannot only
regulate inter-state commerce, but commerce within a particular state if such commerce
would have an effect on inter-state commerce); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (holding that acts which burden or obstruct interstate commerce
or its free flow are within the reach of Congress' power).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, el. seq. (2002)); Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,
20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (1994); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681-1688 (1995).
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result of such legislation is an increasing trend towards nationalizing
education. Education is a function traditionally considered to lie in the
realm of the states.9 The consequence of an increasing trend towards
nationalization is the stripping of an important function, education, from
those bodies most competent to perform such a function-a local school
board acting as an arm of the state. 0
This Comment argues that, by adopting the Seventeenth Amendment, we
have altered the very structure of our government and eroded many of the
protections originally embedded in the Constitution. It develops this
argument in four steps. The Comment first discusses the nature of
federalism, including its purpose and importance as a theory of government
as applied to our American system." Second, it analyzes the contours of
the Seventeenth Amendment, including a discussion on the purposes of the
Senate, the importance of the pre-Seventeenth Amendment method of
electing Senators, and the consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment on
our political system.12 Third, it applies these principles by addressing the
effect of the Seventeenth Amendment on the public school system. 3
Finally, this Comment, after considering some possible resolutions to the
conundrum that the Seventeenth Amendment has presented to the public
school system and the structure of the American system of government,
proposes repealing the Seventeenth Amendment.'
4
II. FEDERALISM: A NOVEL CONCEPT, BUT ONE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORT
A. Federalism Defined, Including Past and Modern Understandings of the
Term
The principle of Federalism, as instituted by the original drafters of the
Constitution, was one of the main structural protections designed to prevent
the central government from consuming the power of the states. 5
9. See Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) (Burger, J.
dissenting) (stating that education is best administered by the local school districts).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.
14. See discussion infra Part V.
15. Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1009 [hereinafter, Zywicki, Senators and
Special Interests] ("The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, providing for
the direct election of U.S. senators, undermined the twin structural pillars of the
Constitution: federalism and the separation of powers.").
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Federalism, simply stated, is the equal distribution of power in an
organization, here a government, between a central authority and the
constituent parts. 16
When the term federalism 7 is used in our modern society, the term
generally connotes the political philosophy of reducing the central
government's sphere of power and increasing or returning such power to
the state governments. At the time of the Philadelphia Convention,
however, the term federalism, or the "federalists," stood for the proposition
of a stronger central government-as compared with the then existing
government under the Confederate States of America.' 8 Federalism aimed
at creating a stronger central government by permitting the central
government to assume certain expressed powers from the states:' 9
Federalism, as originally projected, was a compromise between
confederation and centralization whereby the sovereignty of each
state was curtailed to invest authority in the newly created
federal government. Some functions were placed entirely in
federal hands, others were left exclusively with the states, while
a third group of functions was shared by both.20
16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 644 (8th ed. 2004) (defining federalism as "[t]he
legal relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments
..... "). Black's Law Dictionary also defines "cooperative federalism" as the "Distribution of
power between the federal government and the states in which each recognizes the powers of
the other while jointly engaging in certain governmental functions." Id.
17. Although the term "federalism" was never used by the founders, it was the principle
of federalism that they used in compromising "between those who favored a unitary,
national regime, and those who favored the continuation of the loose confederation of
sovereign states that had existed ever since the Declaration of Independence." Arnold 1.
Bums, The Perspective of Federalism at the United States Department of Justice in 1987, in
FEDERALISM: THE SHIFING BALANCE 45 (Janice C. Griffith, ed. 1989).
18. Under the Articles of Confederation, each state retained its sovereignty, freedom
and independence. See ART. CONFED. art. II.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the authority of the central government was
"dependent on the willingness of the states to accept [the central government's] measures...
• [The central government under the Articles of Confederation] could suggest, but it could
not command." Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in America - An Historical
Overview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE 1, 2 (Janice C. Griffith, ed. 1989).
19. See Roy F. Nichols, Federalism versus Democracy: The Significance of the Civil
War in the History of the United States Federalism, in FEDERALISM AS A DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS 49 (1942).
20. Id. at 49-50.
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The problem, and the reason why the term federalism has taken on a reverse
connotation in our modem society, is that the Seventeenth Amendment
fractured the structure of the government that was set in place after the
1787 convention.2'
The Seventeenth Amendment, in large part, has lead to an ever-
increasing central government.22 As a result of its increased size, the
central government is now an entity engaging in activities it was never
intended to entertain. The balance between the state governments and the
central government, and their respective functions, has been
inharmoniously altered. As a result of the unbalanced and excessively large
central government, the principle of federalism cries out for a restoration of
balance in favor of the state governments.
23
This unbalance in power, scales tipping in favor of the central
government, is what causes our modern society to associate the term
federalism with the idea of reducing the central government's sphere of
power and returning such power to the state governments. Thus,
federalism, as a constitutional principle, seeks a balance between the
centralized power and its constituent parts-the states. 24 Given the size of
our current central government as compared to the size of the central
government in 1787, it should serve as little surprise that we associate a
different meaning with the term federalism than did the founders.
21. See discussion infra Part Ill.
22. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 233 ("[T]he
Seventeenth Amendment destroyed the systems of federalism and bicameralism which had
previously checked expansionist federal activity.").
23. One of the foundational presuppositions of the American system of government is
that the sovereignty rests with the people, not in the organs of government they create, such
as a central or state government. Thus, to be more precise, it is not the state governments
that need power restored to them in order to properly balance our federal system. Rather, it is
the state governments in the sense of the political communities of the people.
The people, in whatever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently,
and whether organized under a regular government, or united by looser and less
definite relations, constitute the state. This is undoubtedly the fundamental
idea upon which the republican institutions of our own country are established.
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1869).
24. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 644 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the terms "federalism"
and "cooperative federalism").
25. In arguing for a stronger union, which would require the allocation of more power to
the central government than what the Articles of Confederation allowed, Hamilton stated:
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle, on which this
interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious observer
on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her union,
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B. Why the Principle of Federalism is Vital for the American Form of
Government
Through the Constitution, the framers initiated our federal system in
which the people allocated certain express powers to the central
government, while leaving all other powers to the states or to the people.26
As Madison wrote in urging the populace to embrace the proposed
constitution, the central government's "jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states, a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. 27
Certain functions or powers between the centralized government and the
governments of the individual states were destined to overlap.2 8  As
advocates such as Madison and Hamilton anticipated, the direct
consequence of the overlap of power between the states and the centralized
government would inevitably lead to conflict between the centralized
government and the government of the states. "Indeed, this conflict and
competition between levels of government was welcomed by the framers as
a means-like the tripartite separation of powers within the federal
government-of preventing the conglomeration of tyrannical power. ', 29
The founders understood that conflict within a political system, if
arranged properly, would not lead to strife and division but, rather, to
strength and protection.3 °
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpation are guarded against, by a division of the Government
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted
to each subdivided among distinct and separate people. The
she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a
barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
THE FEDERALIST No. 18 (Alexander Hamilton).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Arnold I. Burns, The Perspective of Federalism at
the United States Department of Justice in 1987, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTnIG BALANCE,
45, 45 (Janice C. Griffith, ed. 1989).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison).
28. See supra text accompanying note 20.
29. Bums, supra note 26, at 45.
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
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different governments will control each other; at the same time
that each will be controlled by itself.
3
'
However, the structure of the political system must be such that the two
conflicting entities must have near equal power. Otherwise, if one entity
possesses more power than the opposing entity, then the lesser entity will
simply be quashed and no strengthening of the body politic will have taken
place.32 In other words, if either the central government or the states
acquire too much power, then the principle of federalism is usurped along
with any healthy accompanying conflict.
As the founders properly understood, in the American form of
government, it is imperative that the central government and the state
governments serve as a check on one another.33 Even John Dickinson, an
avid Anti-Federalist, stated "that election [of Senators] by state legislatures
would 'produce that collision between the different authorities which would
be wished for in order to check each other.'
34
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, has severed an important
institutional check between the central government and the government of
the states. 35 As a result, the principle of federalism, one of the foundations
of American political theory, has been severely eroded.36
III. THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT EXPOSED: THE ORIGINAL SENATE
AND THE SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
There are a number of purposes that the Senate was created to perform.
Besides conducting the regular duties of a political body, there are three
main purposes that the Senate was designed to serve in the American
political experiment that have been lost as a result of the Seventeenth
Amendment. These lost purposes, the hallmarks of the Senate, are as
follows: the Senate as the voice of reason, the Senate as a voice for the
states in national politics, and bicameralism.
31. Id.
32. Id. ("If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure.").
33. See id.
34. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 171 (quoting
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, S. Doc. No. 404, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1902) (statement by John Dickinson)).
35. See discussion infra Part III.
36. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15 ("[Tlhe Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, providing for the direct election of U.S. senators, undermined the twin
structural pillars of the Constitution: federalism and the separation of powers.").
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A. The Voice of Reason
1. That Temperate and Respectable Body of Citizens
The Senate and House of Representatives were created to serve different
masters in order to achieve the public good. "The object of government
may be divided into two general classes; the one depending on measures
which have singly an immediate and sensible operation (the House of
Representatives); the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and
well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved
operation (the Senate)., 37 "As originally constituted, the House represented
the people directly, but the Senate represented the state legislatures directly,
and the people only indirectly. 38 Accordingly, in order to bring about the
public good while yet serving different masters, each respective branch
reacted to public concerns in accordance with the commands of its master.39
The House of Representatives are directly responsible to the people.4 °
Additionally, members of the House of Representatives serve two-year
terms.4 1  This combination of serving short terms and being directly
responsible to the people requires the members of the House of
Representatives to react quickly to public concerns.42 The House of
Representatives was created to serve as "the voice of passion," to react
swiftly in the face of public outcries.43  As the founders properly
understood, however, if Congress was entirely subject to the voice of
passion, then sheer tyranny would result.44
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 214.
39. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses At The Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens'
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 517 (1997) (discussing the
practice of instruction whereby state legislatures would "instruct" their respect senators on
matters of great importance to that particular state).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.").
41. Id.
42. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 54-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the House of
Representatives' ratio and relation to the people).
43. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION So MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 122 (1993).
44. See THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (Alexander Hamilton).
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In order to prevent the Congress from being ruled entirely by the voice
of passion, the founders created the Senate." 45 As Hamilton noted:
[Tihere are particular moments in public affairs, when the
people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves
will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In
these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of
some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to
check the misguided career and to suspend the blow meditated
by the people against themselves .... 46
Thus, in order to serve as a "temperate and respectable body of citizens,"
the Senate was created. 7
Unlike the House of Representatives, prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment the Senate was not directly responsible to the people of the
several states. 8 Rather, each Senator was directly responsible to his or her
respective state legislative body.49 This allowed the Senate to serve as a
cooling mechanism against the passions of a directly elected body, the
House of Representatives.5" "As opposed to the more populist House
members, Senators were supposed to be men of 'substance' who would
'contribute a wise and stable voice in national deliberation, controlling the
rapid swings expected of the House of Representatives.
' 51
Alexis De Tocqueville, visiting the United States from France in 1830,
wrote in his famous work Democracy in America the following concerning
his impressions of the Senate as compared to the House of Representatives:
45. Bybee, supra note 39, at 512 ("A senate appointed by state legislatures would be a
near-complete defense to national encroachment because the senate controlled one-half of
Congress.").
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (Alexander Hamilton).
47. See HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 16 ("As a final insurance that it remain 'an anchor
against popular fluctuations,' the Senate was elected by the state legislatures.").
48. See supra note 38.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 ("The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by
the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.")
50. Bybee, supra note 39, at 515 ("[The Senate] was a tempering institution, a body of
elite senators whose terms and manner of election ensured greater stability in the
Congress.").
51. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 180 (quoting
Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the
Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 195 (1987)).
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There are some laws, democratic in their nature, which
nonetheless succeed in partially correcting democracy's
dangerous instincts.
When one enters the House of Representatives at Washington,
one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly.
One can often look in vain for a single famous man. Almost all
the members are obscure people whose names form no picture in
one's mind. They are mostly village lawyers, tradesmen, or even
men of the lowest classes. In a country where education is
spread almost universally, it is said that the people's
representatives do not always know how to write correctly.
A couple of paces away is the entrance to the Senate, whose
narrow precincts contain a large proportion of the famous men of
America. There is scarcely a man to be seen there whose name
does not recall some recent claim to fame. They are eloquent
advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates, and noted
statesmen. Every word uttered in this assembly would add luster
to the greatest parliamentary debates in Europe.
What is the reason for this bizarre contrast? Why are the elite
of the nation in one room and not in the other? Why does the
former assembly attract such vulgar elements, whereas the latter
has a monopoly of talents and enlightenment?... Whence, then,
comes this vast difference? I can see only one fact to explain it:
the election which produces the House of Representatives is
direct, whereas the Senate is subject to election in two stages.52
Even a disinterested foreigner such as de Tocqueville understood that what
caused the difference between the House of Representatives and the Senate,
the voice of passion and the voice of reason, was that the Senate was subject
to the state legislatures while the House of Representatives was subject to
the people directly.
2. The Senate Now Subjected to the Sudden Breeze of Passion
"As long as states were represented in the Senate, that body was not
likely to adopt legislation which was opposed by even a significant
52. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 201 (J.P. Mayer ed., Perennial
Classics 1969) (1835) (emphasis added).
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5,3minority of states." Thus, as long as the Senate continued to serve a
different master than the House of Representatives, the Senate would serve
as a check on legislation that was based upon public outcry but was not
necessarily for the public good.54 In recognizing this, Hamilton noted:
The republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of
the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they
entrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an
unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or
to every transient impulse which the people may receive ....
When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the
people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the
persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those
interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give
them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection."
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, drastically altered the Senate's
ability to serve as a check on the House of Representatives. The
Seventeenth Amendment now calls for the direct election of Senators by the
people.56 Hence, the Senate answers the beckoning of a new master: the
people. As a result, the Senate is no longer afforded the opportunity to
serve as the voice of reason, the check against the House of
Representatives. Rather, the Senate, being directly responsible to the
people, must now respond in the same fashion to public outcries as does the
House of Representatives.
At first blush, particularly in view of our modem society's embracement
of direct election,57 it appears desirable to have the public serve as the
master of the Senate. The framers of the structure of the American
government, however, understood well the dangers of direct election.
Madison, commenting on the dangers of "popular governments" governed
by direct election, stated "that measures are too often decided, not
according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by
53. Regulation of the Preemption of State Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the House
Government Reform Committee, 106th Cong. (June 30, 1999) (testimony of Professor John
S. Baker, Jr.), available at 1999 WL 461860.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that "the people commonly
intend the public good," but rarely achieve it when acting out of passion (emphasis added)).
55. Id. (emphasis added)
56. See supra note 3 (citing the relevant text of the Seventeenth Amendment).
57. Other forms of direct election that have garnered favor in recent times include
referendums, initiatives, and recall elections.
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the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. 58  "The
runaway tendencies of popular rule" and "the Framer's distrust of popular
government provided the primary motive force for indirect election of
Senators." 59 "[P]opular election was ruled out, even in those days of sparse
population, as a mockery of the true principles of representation.
Candidates would have too little acquaintance with any but the largest or
most vocal interests." 60
The Seventeenth Amendment, consequently, has removed the Senate as
a check on the House of Representatives, one of the main purposes the
Senate was created to fulfill. Now, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives serve the same master, the people, and both must act out of
passion in order to secure their seats.
B. The Senate as a Voice for the States in National Politics
1. An Agency in the Formation
In order to ensure true federalism, the founders understood that the states
would need a voice in national politics. 61 The second main purpose of the
Senate, then, was to serve as an agent for the states.62 In other words, the
Senate was to serve as a voice within the central government for the benefit
and protection of the states.
This concept, the Senate serving as the states' agent in national politics,
was so well-settled at the founding of the Constitution that only one
paragraph is given over to the discussion of this topic in The Federalist:
63
It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators
by the State Legislatures. Among the various modes which might
have been devised for constituting this branch of the
Government, that which has been proposed by the Convention is
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
59. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 182 (quoting
HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 189 (1995)).
60. HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 17.
61. The central government, through the Supremacy Clause, has a reciprocal voice in
state governments. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
62. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1014.
63. See id. at 1013 n.20.
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probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is
recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
appointment, and of giving to the State Governments such an
agency in the formation of the Federal Government, as must
secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient
link between the two systems.64
"As agents of the state legislatures, the primary duty of senators was to
protect the sphere in which state and local governments could operate, free
from the potentially strong arm of Washington. 65 Senators, understanding
that they were directly responsible to the legislature of their respective state,
would not vote for the passage of legislation that encroached on those
functions that had been reserved to the states. "[T]he Senate protected the
states as states; it stood as a defense to the federal government in the same
way that each of the three branches of the national government had checks
and balances against abuse of power by the other branches."
66
The Senate, then, served as a check by preventing the central
government from encroaching into areas that are traditionally the functions
of the states, such as education. "[T]he equal vote allowed in the Senate is.
. .at once a constitutional recognition of the sovereignty remaining in the
states, and an instrument for the preservation of it. It guards them against..
a consolidation of the states into one simple republic ....
2. The Practice of Instruction
If the Senate were to properly serve as an agent of the states, then the
states would need some mechanism to ensure compliance by its agent.
Thus, the practice of instruction arose.68 "State governments ensured that
senators represented their interests through the historic practice of
'instructing' senators. Under this practice, state legislatures told senators
how to vote on particular legislative items.,,69 "As the 'constituency' of
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton).
65. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1036.
66. Bybee, supra note 39, at 516 (1997).
67. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 502
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1873).
68. "The right to instruct legislators is distinct from the right to present petitions and
otherwise express opinions. Petitions and opinions are advisory; instructions are binding."
Kenneth Bresler, Rediscovering the Right to Instruct Legislators, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 355,
355 (1991).
69. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1036.
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U.S. Senators, the state legislatures regularly instructed [Senators]. '70 "The
right [to instruct Senators] had honorable origins in both the British and the
colonial experience, particularly in the states of the South and Northeast.
71
Former President John Taylor, while serving as a Senator of Virginia,
wrote the following concerning instruction: "I now reaffirm the opinion at
all times heretofore expressed by me, that instructions are mandatory,
provided they do not require a violation of the Constitution or the
commission of an act of moral turpitude., 72 Thus, under the practice of
instruction, if a proposed piece of legislation was before the Senate that
would have an impact on a particular state, then that state's legislature
would direct its two Senators to vote according to the best interest of the
state.73
A famous instance of instruction took place in Virginia in 1812 when the
Virginia legislature passed a resolution concerning the subject of
instruction. The Virginia legislature had instructed both Virginia Senators
to vote against the re-chartering of the Bank of the United States.74 Both
Senators refused, thus spurring the Virginia legislature to pass a resolution
on the practice of instruction. The resolution asserted the "right of the State
Legislatures to instruct their Senators in the Congress of the United States,"
and disapproved of the "conduct of the Senators from this State in
Congress, in relation to the instructions given them at the last session, on
the subject of the Bank of the United States. 75  In summarizing the
Virginia legislature's resolution, Robert Luce stated:
So it was "resolved" that the Assembly disapproved the action
of Senators that raised the issue; declared instruction an
indubitable right, with, as a consequence, bounden duty of
obedience ...and proclaimed that no man who did not hold
himself so bound ought thereafter to accept the appointment of a
Senator of the United States from Virginia.76
70. Bresler, supra note 68, at 365.
71. Bybee, supra note 39, at 517.
72. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING
BY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 469 (The Lawbook Exchange 2006) (1930).
73. Bybee, supra note 39, at 518 (stating that states "could instruct on matters of great
importance to the state or the people").
74. LUCE, supra note 72, at 464 ("Its Legislature had instructed Senators Giles and
Brent to vote against the recharter of the Bank.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
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Senators who refused to vote according to their respective state
legislature's instructions faced the obvious consequence of not being re-
elected for a subsequent term. 7 Moreover, "Senators who failed to heed
their instructions were usually forced to resign, even if their terms were not
complete. 78 Thus, Senators understood the importance of following their
respective state legislature's instructions and, equally, the states had a
means of ensuring that their voices in the national government were
accurately heard.79
The states' ability to instruct its agent, however, was severed with the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.80 "As an ultimate irony, the last
recorded refusal to follow legislative instructions was that of Senator
Weldon Heybum of Idaho, who refused to support the Seventeenth
Amendment and disenfranchise the body that elected him.,
81
77. Robert Luce tells an amusing story about a particular instance where a Senator
refused his legislature's instruction and was later called to account for his actions:
Two English women who traveled in America have told about the
experiences of men who disobeyed instructions. "I remember," wrote one
whose book was published in 1821, "the case of a distinguished member from
the west of Pennsylvania (Mr. Baldwin), who once voted in decided opposition
to his received instructions. At his return home, he was summoned to give an
explanation or apology, under risk of being thrown out. The member replied
that, at the time of his vote, he had expressed his regret that his opinion differed
from that of his electors; but that he should have been unworthy of the
distinguished office he held, and of the public confidence which he had for so
many years enjoyed, if he could apologize for having voted according to the
decision of his judgment; that his fellow citizens were perfectly right to transfer
their voices to the man who might more thoroughly agree with them in
sentiment than in this case he had done; that for himself, he could not only
promise to consider every question attentively and candidly, to weigh duly the
wishes of his constituents, but never to vote in decided opposition to his own
opinion. His fellow citizens received his declaration with applause, and, as his
whole political life had been in unison with their sentiments, they took this one
instance of dissent as additional proof of his integrity, and unanimously
reelected him."
Id. at 466-67 (footnote omitted).
78. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1036.
79. Bybee, supra note 39, at 519 ("[Tlhe state legislatures elected senators and could re-
elect them. Accordingly, there was an efficient mechanism--the legislature-for advising
senators, and a means-refusal to re-elect-for disciplining those who disobeyed
instructions.").
80. Id. at 527 ("the practice [of instruction] survived until the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment").
81. Id. at 527-28.
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3. Specific Functions Exclusive of the Senate
In accordance with the ideal of giving the states a voice in national
politics via the Senate, a number of functions are specifically given to the
Senate. The President is required to obtain the "advice and consent" of the
Senate in order to appoint ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and
federal judges.82 Additionally, the President must receive approval of at
least two-thirds of the Senate before a treaty becomes binding.83 Further, in
instances of impeachment, the sole power to try the offense that led to the
impeachment is confided in the Senate.84
In all of the above-described powers that have expressly been entrusted
to the Senate, no corresponding power exists in the House of
Representatives.85 The reason for the allocation of these powers within the
Senate is not a statement that the members of the House of Representatives
are somehow not capable of fulfilling such duties. Rather, the allocation of
these powers to the Senate, the agent of the states, was a deliberate act on
the part of the framers to give the states a voice in matters that are of
important national concern. In discussing the rationale for confiding the
advice and consent power in the Senate, as opposed to simply allowing the
President to appoint whomever he desired, Hamilton stated:
82. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
83. Id.
84. Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the United States Constitution provides:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
85. The House of Representatives has the power to impeach, but they do not have any
power to try the offense. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ...
shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.").
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To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I
answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a
powerful, though in general a silent operation. It would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and
would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit character
from State prejudice .... s6
With respect to the appointment of judges, none could be more important
to the states than the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. The
Supreme Court is to serve as the final arbiter in a number of situations that
involve the states.88  Consequently, being subject to the authoritative
disposition by the Supreme Court, states have a significant interest in
Justices that are appointed to the Supreme Court. The requirement of
gaining the Senate's consent to Supreme Court nominees, prior to the
Seventeenth Amendment, ensured the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices that were mindful of the delicate balance of federalism. 9
Treaties are also of significant importance to the states. As the
Constitution states, Treaties are to be treated as "the supreme Law of the
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
87. Black's Law Dictionary defines "our federalism" as "[t]he doctrine holding that a
federal court must refrain from hearing a constitutional challenge to state action if federal
adjudication would be considered an improper intrusion in the state's right to enforce its
own laws in its own courts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (8th ed. 2004). This concept
undoubtedly represents the principle of federalism in the court system, a concept that
arguably has been lost in our modem federal judiciary.
88. Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of
different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
89. See supra notes 59-63.
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Land."90  If the President could enter into a binding treaty without the
advice and consent of the Senate, then the states would be subjected to a
"supreme Law" without acquiescing. The founders, mindful of the balance
of federalism, required the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate
before a treaty would have the effect of becoming the "supreme Law." 91 As
a result of the Senate serving as an agent of the states, providing a check on
an encroaching central government, the President could not enter into a
treaty "without an equal eye to the interests of all the states. 92
Consequently, the states have lost their voice in matters of national
concern since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. The states are
no longer capable of defending against "the strong arm of Washington."
93
Consequently, states can no longer ensure, for example through the
Senate's advice and consent power, that issues which are traditionally state
functions, such as education, will not be encroached by the federal
judiciary.
C. Bicameralism: The Lost Art of Constitutional Protection
"In framing a government, which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the Government to
control the governed; and in the next place, oblige [the Government] to
control itself."94 Bicameralism, not to be confused with federalism,95 is an
important check instituted by the founders to protect against encroachment
by the central government. As the framers recognized, Congress is the
most powerful and dangerous branch of government in the American
system:
In republican government, the Legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide
the Legislature into different branches; and to render them by
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur").
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
93. See supra note 65.
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
95. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 176
("Federalism deals with the allocation of power between the state and federal governments.
Bicameralism, by contrast, is concerned with the type of legislation passed by the federal
government.") (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 2:521
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 538 2007-2008
2008] FEDERALISM AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 539
different modes of election, and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other, as the nature of their common
functions, and their common dependence on the society, will
admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous
encroachments, by still further precautions.96
Consequently, an additional structural protection, namely bicameralism,
was built into the Constitution to safeguard against any potential abuse by
Congress.
The framers instituted the institutional protection of bicameralism in
order to prevent the passage of legislation at the mere sound of a public
outcry, so that the public good, not the public will, would be
accomplished.97 In describing the Senate's role in raising the shield of
bicameralism, Hamilton wrote:
Another advantage accruing from the ingredient in the
Constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must
prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution
can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority
of the people and then, of a majority of the states. It must be
acknowledged, that this [is a] complicated check on legislation
... [but] as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the
diseases to which our Governments are most liable, it is not
impossible, that this part of the Constitution may be more
convenient in practice, than it appears to many in
contemplation.
98
In order for legislation to be binding, it must meet approval by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and then be signed into law by the
President.99 Hence, "[b]efore taking effect, legislation would have to be
ratified by two independent power sources: the people's representatives in
the House, and the state legislatures' agents in the Senate." 1
Bicameralism also helps ensure that Congress only passes legislation that
is based upon the public good, as opposed to passing legislation that only
benefits a particular special interest group. In order for a special interest
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
97. See Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1034-35.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States").
100. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1034.
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group to procure legislation, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, the
group would have had to convince a majority of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.' 0 ' In order to procure a majority amongst
the Senate, however, the special interest group would have to convince over
half of the state legislatures. If the special interest group was successful in
such an endeavor, then the proposed legislation would likely favor the
public good and the principle of federalism.
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, removed the impediment to
legislation that bicameralism once provided. Prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment, bicameralism ensured that legislation which was not
committed to the public good would not be enacted because both the House
of Representatives and the Senate were accountable to distinct masters.1
0 2
This accountability to separate constituencies served as the foundation for
bicameralism in the American form of government.1 3 Now, however, boththe Senate and the House of Representatives are accountable to the same
constituency.' 04
Being accountable to the same constituency enables private interest
groups to easily procure beneficial legislation, regardless of whether it
bolsters the public good. "Private interest legislation is common today,
much more so than in 1787, and more common at the national level than
among the states."'0 5 The reason for the rise in a private interest group's
ability to procure legislation is because both houses of Congress are, since
the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, responsible to the same
constituency. When both houses of a bicameral legislature represent the
same constituency, "then the winning coalition in the first house could
easily be replicated in the second house, thereby undermining the purpose
of bicameralism in protecting the public from special interest[] [groups].' 0 6
"If, however, the two houses are drawn from different constituencies, the
logrolling coalitions necessary to generate passage in both houses become
101. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 177-78 ("[A]
special interest group seeking preferential legislation will have to put together a winning
coalition in both houses.") (emphasis in original).
102. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (describing how to ensure that the
public good is not discarded).
103. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 176 ("By
making the House and Senate accountable to different constituencies, the Framers sought to
thwart special interests and ensure that legislation furthered the public good.").
104. See discussion supra Part III.A. I.
105. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison' Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1328, 1334 (1994).
106. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 178-79.
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more complicated" and, thus, a private interest group's ability to procure
legislation inapposite to the public good becomes frustrated.1
0 7
As a result of the Seventeenth Amendment, even though both the Senate
and the House of Representatives must still approve a bill before it can be
enacted, the shield of bicameralism has been lost. This final main purpose
of the Senate, to ensure that the structural protection of bicameralism
prevents the passage of legislation that is not for the public good, has been
removed.
D. Why the Post-Seventeenth Amendment Senate Is Unable to Fulfill the
Originally Intended Senatorial Purposes
1. The People Fall Short
When discussing the abstractness of the Seventeenth Amendment, one
cannot avoid discussing the temptations of direct democracy. In fact, in
modem America, the idea of a direct democracy is often seen as the
pinnacle of political achievement. In succinctly diagnosing the problem,
C.H. Hoebeke writes:
It is nevertheless fair to say that the political thinking that
brought about the Seventeenth Amendment has remained
triumphant down to the present day. There is little appreciation
for the classical notion of constitutionalism as a means of
checking the sovereign, and not merely the sovereign's
magistrates. Public discourse gives substantially little
consideration to the history of well-balanced polities, in which
democracy has comprised but a single element, not the sole one.
And among those in power, significantly few voices are raised to
remind the people that they themselves are ultimately
responsible for the problems in their government, that politicians
who promise to fulfill [the people's] every demand do no service
to [the people's] long-term interests, and that they ought to
suspect the flatterers who offer to put them more directly in
command. It is hard to imagine, therefore, the well-nigh total
revolution in thinking that would be necessary to arrest, let
alone reverse, the erosion of constitutional barriers that has
107. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1031.
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occurred under the steady force of the political philosophy of
obedience to oneself 108
As long as people continue to embrace the notion that pure democracy is
the greatest political good, the consequences of the Seventeenth
Amendment cannot be fully appreciated. The framers understood well the
dangers of placing the powers of government directly with the people. 109
One danger that has arisen as a result of the Seventeenth Amendment is
the people's inability to serve as an effective check on their representatives
in the Senate in order to ensure that such members are fulfilling their
Senatorial purposes." 0 "A . . . characteristic of the movement to direct
election was that it made monitoring a senator's behavior more difficult.
As monitoring became more difficult, it became easier for senators to
sacrifice their constituents' concerns for their own desires and those of
special-interest groups.""' Modem society keeps Americans busy enough
with their own affairs, let alone the responsibility of adequately keeping
tabs on a fast-paced Senatorial body. "[T]he sad truth is that the average
citizen is apt to know far less about the character and conduct of his senator
than he did before direct elections. This is probably the single greatest
irony of the whole direct democracy movement."' 1 2 As opposed to the
American people, however, the state legislatures were an ideal body
capable of properly monitoring the Senate.
"As compared to the dispersed public, state legislatures had a superior
ability to monitor the behavior of Senators. Because of their familiarity
with government and law-making, . . . state legislatures were in a better
position than the dispersed public to gain access to important information
... [and] to interpret information."' ' 3 The general public, often uneducated
in the science of politics, cannot effectively monitor the behavior of the
Senate. "One legislator in a body of forty legislators can have some
practical control over a senator's behavior; one voter in a constituency of
several million cannot."' 1 4  Besides, even if every American was well
versed in the science of politics, the only mechanism of control over the
post-Seventeenth Amendment Senate is voting every six years; whereas, in
addition to merely monitoring, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment there
108. HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 194 (emphasis added).
109. See supra notes 59-61, and accompanying text.
110. See supra Parts III.A-IlI.C for a discussion on Senatorial purposes.
111. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1041.
112. HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 192.
113. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 201.
114. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1041.
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existed controls such as instruction." s Now, however, the people are only
left with the voting polls, a poor check on the activities of a Senator during
the interim six years.
In addition to having the proper tools to effectively monitor the Senate,
the state legislatures also had a greater incentive to monitor the Senate as
compared to the people generally. "[B]ecause they elected and instructed
senators, legislators had an incentive to monitor their behavior; the
legislator could be made to suffer at the polls for unpopular decisions by
senators."' 16 Thus, state legislators had an obvious motive, albeit a self-
driven motive, to monitor the voting behavior of Senators: during re-
election each state legislator would be held accountable for failing to
properly monitor the actions of the state's Senators.
Thus, the decreased monitoring that has occurred as a result of the
Seventeenth Amendment has left Senatorial behavior virtually unchecked.
Consequently, the main purposes of the Senate-to serve as the voice of
reason, to serve as an agent for the states, and to ensure the principle of
bicameralism-are no longer accomplished by the post-Seventeenth
Amendment Senate because of the loss of an effective check, the state
legislatures, on the Senatorial body.
2. The Change in Constituency
In addition to decreased monitoring, the most compelling reason for the
Senate's inability to perform its main intended purposes is the change in the
Senate's constituency that resulted from the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment. As a result of direct election, Senators now have a different
motive for acting upon legislation than what existed prior to the
Seventeenth Amendment." 7  Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment,
Senators understood that in order to ensure re-election, they would have to
support only the legislation that was in the best interest of their respective
state. 1 18  A natural consequence of this process was the protection of
federalism and bicameralism.'" 9
115. See discussion supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the tool of instruction).
116. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests, supra note 15, at 1041 (emphasis added).
117. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 217 ("Direct
election made Senators responsive to the same national forces which influenced House
members.").
118. See discussion supra Part III.B.1; see also Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth
Amendment, supra note 1, at 216 ("Senators would be expected to reward their home-state
interests .... ").
119. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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The Seventeenth Amendment has not changed the Senate's necessity to
serve its constituents in order to ensure re-election. However, the change in
constituency that resulted from the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment
altered the behavior of the Senate, thus severing the Senate's desire to
fulfill its main intended purposes-to serve as the voice of reason, to serve
as an agent for the states, and to ensure the principle of bicameralism. 20
The behavior of the Senate, still premised on each Senator's desire for re-
election, now responds to the beckoning of those responsible for placing
him or her in office-special interest groups.'
2
'
Senatorial campaigns are far from inexpensive.'22 In 1988, a Democratic
Senator from Wisconsin spent $7 million vying for his first Senatorial
seat. 23 In 1990, a Republican Senator from Texas spent $12.5 million in
order to secure his re-election.' 24 Nation-wide, the estimated average cost
of a Senatorial campaign is $5 million. 125  The typical, middle-class
American is not capable of providing the funding necessary in order for a
post-Seventeenth Amendment Senator to become elected; rather, Senators
primarily rely on special interest groups to provide the funding necessary in
order to procure election. "An increasing proportion of campaign
contributions comes from nationally organized interests outside the state a
senator actually represents .... 26
120. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 216
("Movement to direct election made it possible for [special interest groups] to lobby
Senators directly, and for Senators to make use of the resources (money and manpower)
provided by these interstate interest groups.").
121. See id. at 218 ("[S]pecial interests make their campaign payments up-front, but they
do not receive their legislation until later.").
122. In describing the media frenzy that Senatorial campaigns now generate, C.H.
Hoebeke writes:
A hundred years ago, entire speeches from Senate proceedings were quoted
verbatim in the daily newspapers. Today, senators vie with each other for as
few as five second "sound bytes" on the evening news....
The vast majority of campaign money is spent on advertising, increasingly
on half or even quarter-minute appeals on television. Large commissions are
paid out to successful public relations firms, armed with the latest marketing
data, to yield the highest emotional response with the least amount of footage.
HOEBEKE, supra note 2, at 192-93.
123. Id. at 191.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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As C.H. Hoebeke stated:
[T]he Seventeenth Amendment has utterly failed to drive the
influence of money, special interests, and backstage
manipulators from the election of United States senators. On the
other hand, it succeeded in making the Senate, and thus the
Congress in general, more responsive, and in the process less
deliberative in the use of its many powers. As one former
member and scholar of the institution has written, the Senate
"has become less responsible as it has grown more responsive,
less efficient as it has grown more representative.'' 27
As a result of the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators still serve their
respective masters. However, instead of serving the interest of the states,
Senators now serve at the benefit of private interest groups in order to
ensure election and re-election.
IV. THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM:
FEELING THE LASHES OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
Ever since the inception of the public school system, education has been
a local function: local school districts working at the community level and
maintaining responsibility to the state and to the parents. 128  One statute
enacted in the earliest days of colonial America, "ye old deluder" statute,
solidified the principle that education is a local function. 12 9 Connecticut
enacted virtually the same law in 1650.130 Since the passage of the
127. Id., quoting FRED R. HARRIS, DEADLOCK OR DECISION: THE U.S. SENATE AND THE
RISE OF NATIONAL POLITICS 7 (1993).
128. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools."); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) ("[Congress does not have] the authority to
regulate each and every aspect of local schools."); id. 514 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that education is a "traditional concern of the States").
129. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, VOL. I: TO
1898 29 (7th ed. 1965). The 'ye old deluder" statute stated originally as follows:
It being one chiefe project of ye ould deluder, Satan, to keepe men from the
knowledge of ye Scriptures .... It is therefore ordred, yt evry towneship...
forthwith appoint one.., to teach all such children... to write & reade [and]
whose wages shall be paid eithr by ye parents to mastrs of such children, or by
ye inhaitants in genral ... "
Id.
130. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-
1783 181-82 (1970).
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Seventeenth Amendment, however, education is becoming less of a
localized function and becoming more of a nationalized function. As Chief
Justice Burger stated:
Local control is not only vital to continued public support of the
schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational
standpoint as well. The success of any school system depends
on a vast range of factors that lie beyond the competence and
power of the courts. Curricular decisions, the structuring of
grade levels, the planning of extracurricular activities, to mention
a few, are matters lying solely within the province of school
officials, who maintain a day-to-day supervision ....
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, threatens the "overriding
importance" of the local control of education by removing the voice of the
states in the national government.
Education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.1 2 Despite the fact that there is no federal right to education,
the federal government has steadily encroached on the states' ability to
function in the realm of education. Through the enactment of a series of
legislative measures, Congress has steadily moved towards standardizing
education.
Congress first proceeded through the enactment of the National Defense
Education Act ("NDEA").'33 In 1957, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, or U.S.S.R., launched the first ever satellite into space.
Americans immediately feared being out-performed in the area of science
by our Soviet antagonists. As a result, Congress enacted the NDEA in
131. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) (Burger, J.
dissenting) (emphasis added).
132. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). ("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected."). Many state constitutions,
however, have been interpreted as guaranteeing a fundamental right to education. See, e.g.,
Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F.Supp. 1544, 1557 (D. Utah 1995)
("Utah's constitution required the legislature to provide for 'the establishment and
maintenance of the state's education systems including... a public education system, which
shall be open to all children of the state..."') (quoting UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (holding that education is a fundamental right
under the Minnesota constitution). Contra Idaho Sch's for Equal Educ.'al Opportunity v.
Evans 850 P.2d 724, 733 (Idaho 1993) ("[E]ducation is not a fundamental right because it is
not a right directly guaranteed by the state constitution").
133. National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, Pub. L. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (later omitted)).
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order to foster the American school system's achievement in the areas of
mathematics and science.
34
The next significant piece of federal legislation in the realm of education
was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"). 135
The ESEA was primarily championed by President Johnson as a part of his
campaign to help eliminate poverty and racial tensions in America. 136 As a
result, the ESEA, commonly referred to as "Title I," was designed to
provide assistance to states and local school districts in their task of
adequately educating low income families.' 37 Under Title I, unlike the No
Child Left Behind Act that would later replace it, each school was allowed
to choose its own method of assessing students. 3 8 At this point, the states
and their educational systems were free from having to seek the national
government's approval in using a particular method of assessment.
In 1983, the U.S. Department of Education published A Nation at Risk.13
9
The status of public education in 1983, according to the U.S. Department of
Education's A Nation at Risk, was "described as undermining the ability of
the United States to compete in the global economy.' 40  Similar to the
reaction of our nation's lawmakers to the Russian Space satellite Sputnik,
there was an outcry for intervention in the public educational system.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush called the nation's governors to
Charlottesville, Virginia, for the first ever National Education Summit. The
nation's leaders descended upon Virginia for the purpose of establishing "a
set of challenging education standards: Goals 2000, the National Education
134. See Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence & Equal Opportunity in Educ.: No
Conflict of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 997, 1003 (2001) ("[T]he federal government [was]
stunned by the apparent superior position of the Soviet Union in science and mathematics.
The ... public school system[ ] attempted to move quickly to reclaim [its] position[ ] as first
among nations of the world in science, mathematics, and technology by making increased
and significant investments in science and mathematics education for American students.").
135. Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A §§ 6301-7941).
136. CARL F. KAESTLE, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION SINCE WORLD WAR II: PURPOSES
AND POLITICS IN THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY
EDUCATION 23 (2001).
137. Judith A. Winston, Achieving excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No
Conflict of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 997, 1004 (2001) ("Children [of low income families]
participating in the Title I program receive supplementary education assistance in basic
subjects such as reading and math.").
138. Id.
139. Nat'l Comm'n on Educ. Excellence, A Nation at Risk (1983), available at
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html (last visited March 11, 2008).
140. Winston, supra note 138, at 1002 n.l 1.
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Goals.'' Congress subsequently codified the National Education Goals.142
The Goals 2000 offered to states the promise of federal funding if the states
would develop rigorous academic standards. 143 This was the largest step to
date in moving towards a national, standardized public school system.
"By the end of the 1990's ...every state in the nation had enacted
educational standards that defined the rights of their students to an adequate
education, and all but one had state assessments to measure achievement of
at least some standards."'" Hence, the push for uniform standard-based
education started to gain momentum as a consequence of such national
legislation.
As a result of the momentum towards uniform standard-based education
that national legislation had sparked, Congress enacted the Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994 ("IASA"). 145 For the first time, Congress
began making demands on the states in the realm of public education.
IASA required uniformity in the system of standard based education that
was already the result of the national government's pressures. 46 Through
IASA, Congress required the states that were receiving federal funding for
Title I students, to hold such students accountable for the same standards
that the state had enacted for all non-Title I students. 147 In other words,
Congress mandated that the states apply the same standard-based testing to
its students, regardless of whether such students were Title I students that
were in need of additional assistance.1
48
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left
Behind Act ("NCLBA") into law. 149 The NCLBA makes significant
increases in the number of mandates placed upon States and their respective
141. Id, at 1009.
142. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 128 (1994)
(current version at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-6084).
143. See id.
144. David Nash, Note, Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and
equity in Partnership with the States, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 239, 246-47 (2002).
145. Improving America's Schools Act (IASA) of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
3518 (1994) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. 20 §§ 6301-7941).
146. See supra note 138.
147. See supra note 145.
148. See Winston, supra note 138, at 1010 ("[P]oor children are now expected to meet
the same levels of performance and achievement as wealthier students. Schools are expected
to provide these children with the kind of instructional quality that will close the gap in
achievement between them and more affluent non-Title I students.").
149. No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, et. seq. (2002)).
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educational institutions' so A discussion of only a few provisions of the
NCLBA is needed in order to illustrate the significant demands that
Congress has placed on the states as a result of the NCLBA.
States are required to administer tests primarily in the subjects of
mathematics and language arts. States are to administer such tests to its
students every year in grades three until eight and at least once in grades ten
through twelve.' 51 In addition to testing for mathematics and language arts,
states must also administer science tests at least once to its students during
each of the elementary, middle school, and high school years. 52  Yet
another command placed upon the states, one that is generally met with
controversy, is that by the year 2014 states must have 100% of its students
successfully completing the assessment tests.'
Further, in order to ensure that the tests administered by the states are
adequate in the areas of reading and mathematics, states are required to
participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress. '
54
Congress, for the first time in the educational realm, also places penalties
on states if they fail to meet certain provisions of the NCLBA. 55
Competition and experimentation are hallmarks of the American form of
government. In speaking of the functions traditionally left to the states,
with fifty members in the Union, it is possible to have fifty distinct
approaches to the same function. Yet, in the realm of education, Congress
is pressing the states towards a uniform approach in educating public school
children.
15 6
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions
to meet changing social and economic needs. . . . To stay
experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
150. This paper is not concerned with whether the NCLBA has been successful in
implementing its stated goals. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 ("The purpose of [the NCLBA] is to
ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement
standards and state academic assessments."). Rather, this paper is only concerned with
Congress' infringement upon the states in the area of education in violation of the principle
of federalism.
151. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(3)(C)(vii).
152. See § 6311(b)(3)(A).
153. See § 6311 (b)(2)(F).
154. See § 6311 (c)(ii).
155. See, e.g., § 6311(g)(2).
156. See discussion supra Part IV.
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with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. '57
The removal of federalism as a structural protection in our American
system of government has all but eliminated the ability of a "courageous
state" to "serve as a laboratory" in the ambit of education.
As the above review of the progression of national legislation
demonstrates, Congress is steadily moving into the realm of education, a
function traditionally asserted to be that of the states.'5 8 As a result of the
Seventeenth Amendment, states no longer have a voice in Congress." 9 The
Senate, serving as the agent of the states, was once held to be the bastion of
the states in the national government in such critical issues as education.
160
As the No Child Left Behind Act demonstrates, however, any notion of
respecting the states' ability to perform traditional state functions was
amended along with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS TO THE CONUNDRUM OF THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
As is often said, one should not pose a problem without a willingness to
present a solution. When speaking of the problem posed by the
Seventeenth Amendment, however, the range of possible solutions do not
present an optimistic outlook for re-instituting the structure of government
originally instituted by the framers. There are, however, a few possible
solutions worthy of discussion.
A. Possible Direct Resolutions With Respect to the Public School System
The function of education is not a specific, enumerated power of
Congress.' 61 Consequently, in order for Congress to control education, it
must use one of its enumerated powers to control education indirectly.
With respect to the pieces of legislation discussed above, Congress has
157. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
158. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
159. See discussion supra Part II.
160. See supra notes 61-67 (discussing the Senate as an agent of the states).
161. See U.S. CONsT. art I.
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chosen to exercise its "spending power" to indirectly control education.1
62
"[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature
of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.' ' 63  Thus, in speaking of the national
legislation affecting the public school system, the states must first accept
the financial support proffered by Congress in order for such legislation to
be binding on the states.
"The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending
power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the
terms of the 'contract. ' 164  Once a particular state accepts the federal
funding in the realm of education, it must thereby accept the demands that
Congress has conditioned upon accepting the funding.165  Hence, one
possible resolution for the states to avoid the commands of Congress in the
realm of education is to simply refuse the federal funding being conditioned
by Congress.
The states refusal to accept the conditioned funding in the realm of
education by Congress, however, is a practical solution that does not
resolve the underlying structural problem posed by the Seventeenth
Amendment. Even if many of the states refused to accept the funding
provided by Congress, such actions would not preclude Congress from
positing legislation that further encroached into the realm of education.
Additionally, some have argued that the states' ability to reject the
conditioned federal funding is not realistic.'6 Regardless, an individual
state's refusal to accept the conditioned federal funding would serve only as
a short term resolution.
162. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States;").
163. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (Pa. 1981) (discussing
Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the spending clause).
164. Id.
165. Id. ("[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it
shall disburse federal money to the States.")
166. See Gina Austin, Comment, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left
Behind Act Usurps States' Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 337 (2005) ("the NCLBA
provides no practical method of refusing funds because states cannot realistically cut all
federal education subsidies from their budgets"); Gary Natriello & Edward L. McDill, Title
I: From Funding Mechanism to Educational Program, available at http://www.columbia.
edu/-gjn6/idOOl.html (last visited March 11, 2008).
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Another possible resolution for the states is to follow the Utah model. 167
Utah accepted the federal money conditioned by the No Child Left Behind
Act. However, Utah did not stop by simply accepting the federal money
and the directives of Congress. Rather, the Utah legislature passed a bill
designed to protect Utah's sovereignty over the realm of education and yet
still implement the No Child Left Behind Act.
68
The bill Utah designed to accomplish this two-fold purpose is known as
the "Implementing Federal Programs Act.' '169  Under this bill, state
educators are required to provide "'first priority to meeting state goals,
objectives, program needs, and accountability systems as they relate to
federal programs,"'170 and provide "second priority to implementing
federal goals, objectives, program needs, and accountability systems that
do not directly and simultaneously advance state goals, objectives,
program needs, and accountability systems."'
17 1
States following a similar model as the Implementing Federal Programs
Act would require their local school boards and school administrators to
continue to primarily implement state educational objectives and only
implement federal educational objectives to the extent that they do not
contradict the state mandates. 172 The Utah approach, however, has been
questioned by a host of critics including the Secretary of Education.'73
More importantly, Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings warned that,
depending on how Utah applies the Implementing Federal Programs Act,
the Department of Education might withhold $76 million of the $107
million that Utah currently receives in federal education subsidies. 174
Thus, the extreme approach taken by the Utah legislature does not
appear to be an amicable solution to the federal government intruding into
167. For a critique of the approach taken by the Utah legislature, see Joshua. J. Bennett,
Note, Using Utah's Children As Collateral In A Gamble For State's Rights: Why House
Billl01 Is Fundamentally Flawed, 8 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 225 (2006).
168. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A- 1-903 (West 2005).
169. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-901 (West 2005).
170. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A- 1-903(2)(a)(i) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
171. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A- 1-903(2)(a)(ii) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
172. See id.
173. Sam Dillon, Utah Vote Rejects Parts of Education Law, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 20, 2005,
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/20/national/20child.html?ex=1 271
649600&amp;en=b259a0074c6cf357&amp;ei=5090&amp;partner=rssuserland&amp;emc=r
ss (last visited March 11, 2008).
174. See id.
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the area of education. 75 Again, while the Utah model might temporarily
ensure that the function of educating Utah residence remains with the state
of Utah, the Implementing Federal Programs Act does nothing to remedy
the underlying structural problem posed by the Seventeenth Amendment.
B. Curing the Disease and Not Merely the Symptoms
Removing the structural protection of federalism from the American
form of government has had far reaching consequences.1 76  The
Seventeenth Amendment has not only altered the way that Senators are
elected, but has also had the effect of centralizing education, a function
traditionally considered to be local in nature. 177 However, simply focusing
on the realm of education ignores the fundamental problem that is the root
of the ever-expanding tree known as the federal government.
Consequently, the only way to attack the disease and not merely treat the
symptoms is to work towards repealing the Seventeenth Amendment.
Amendments to the United States Constitution may be passed in one of
two ways.1 78 If two-thirds of the states call for a constitutional convention,
then Congress must convene a convention for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the Constitution.179 As history has proven, however, this
method of amending the Constitution has proven unfruitful.18 0 In fact, the
constitutional convention method of amending the Constitution has never
been utilized. 8'
175. In addition to not being an amicable solution, there are some moral implications to
accepting the federal government's financial contributions but refusing to accept the terms
that the contributions were conditioned upon. In keeping with the contract analogy, Utah
would certainly appear to be in breach. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
176. See discussion supra Parts II & III.
177. See discussion supra Part IV.
178. See U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress;").
179. Id.; see also Bybee, supra note 39, at 564 (1997) (discussing the Article V
Amendment process).
180. See Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 232 ("A
constitutional convention has proven itself not to be a viable amendment procedure .....
181. Id. at213.
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The other method of amending the Constitution takes place when two-
thirds of both the House of Representatives and the Senate propose an
amendment that is passed by three-quarters of the state legislatures or state
conventions. 8 2 This method of Congress proposing an amendment has
produced all twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution. 83 Thus, in
treating the disease that the Seventeenth Amendment has posed, we must
strive to utilize this method of repealing the Seventeenth Amendment.
Congress, however, will not willingly give up the power that the
Seventeenth Amendment has vested. Moreover, "[t]he tide of democracy is
generally difficult to contain, much less reverse. Democracy is popular.
Abstract notions of federalism, bicameralism and deliberation provide poor
counterweights to the irresistibility of democratic tides."' 4 Thus, in order
to overcome the "tide of democracy," we must strive to educate the general
populace on the issue of federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment.
The framers' rationale for placing such structural protections as
federalism and bicameralism are instructive. However, in striving to
educate the general populace, this Comment is not calling for a repeal of the
Seventeenth Amendment based upon the notion that merely because the
founders intended Senators to be appointed by the state legislatures we
should therefore return to following such an intention. Rather, this
Comment calls for a repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment based upon the
notion that the structural protections afforded by the pre-Seventeenth
Amendment Senate are vital for the continuing freedoms long cherished by
American citizens.
The "grass roots" methodology, which calls upon a myriad of sources, is
the only technique capable of sparking enough debate to call the
Seventeenth Amendment to the public's attention. Once the grass roots
methodology educates the general public about the structural problems that
the Seventeenth Amendment has presented to the American form of
government, we may then strive to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment.
However, we cannot merely petition our current Senators and House of
Representative members to propose an amendment that would repeal the
Seventeenth Amendment. Rather, the most effective method of repealing
the Seventeenth Amendment must be based upon a campaign promise.
Namely, that persons running for election to Congress must incorporate as
part of their platform for election the promise of proposing an amendment
182. U.S. CONST. art. V.
183. Zywicki, History of the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 1, at 213.
184. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
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that would repeal the Seventeenth Amendment. Only then, when we make
it utterly clear that we are electing the individual based largely upon
whether he or she will push to restore the principle of federalism that has
been lost as a result of the Seventeenth Amendment, will the structural
protections envisioned by the framers be restored.
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